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The contemporary human rights movement holds up Nuremberg as a 
template with which to define responsibility for mass violence.  The lesson of 
Nuremberg is two-fold: one, responsibility for mass violence is criminal and 
must be ascribed to individual agents; above all, this responsibility is said to 
be ethical, not political. Two, criminal justice is the only politically viable and 
morally acceptable response to mass violence. Turned into the founding mo-
ment of the new human rights movement, Nuremberg is today the model for 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and is held as the fitting anti-dote to 
every incident of mass violence.  
If Nuremberg has been turned into the founding moment of a new para-
digm for justice, the end of apartheid has been exceptionalized as an improb-
able outcome produced by the exceptional personality of Nelson Mandela.  It 
is thus said that Africa’s problems – the violence of civil wars – is a result of 
a culture of impunity among African leaders, one that calls for punishment 
rather than political reform.  
Nuremberg as ictims’ Justice
For a long time, Nuremberg was seen as an example of victors’ justice, 
meted out by victorious Allies to defeated Nazis. Today, however, Nuremberg 
is also identified with victims’ justice; indeed, Nuremberg provides a good 
example to demonstrate that we should see victims’ justice as a complement 
to victor’s justice, and not as an alternative to it.  
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Victors’ justice and victims’ justice are not alternatives; they are two sides 
of the same coin. Victims’ justice is not possible without a victor who can set 
up a rule of law under which victims may obtain justice. Criminal justice, 
like the military battlefield, is a place where there can only be winners and 
losers. It produces a new round of winners and losers and sets up the ground 
for the next war. 
Nuremberg functioned as part of a larger political logic shared by the vic-
torious Allied powers. This was that winners and losers, victims and perpe-
trators, must be physically separated into different political communities.  As 
they redrew boundaries and transferred millions across borders, the result was 
the most extreme ethnic cleansing in modern history. By 1950, between 12 
and 14 million Germans had fled or were expelled from east-central Europe. 
Historians consider this the largest forcible movement of any population 
in modern Europe history.  It is estimated that more than 20 million were 
forcibly transferred from Central and Eastern Europe. According to German 
federal agencies and the German Red Cross, between 2 and 2.5 million ci-
vilians died in the course of expulsions. Some writers describe this forced 
movement as ‘population transfer,’ others as ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and yet others 
as ‘genocide.’ But all agree that the shared ground between victors’ justice and 
victims’ justice is revenge.
 As perpetrators huddled in Germany, victims departed for another home-
land. The process culminated in the period after Nuremberg with the creation 
of the State of Israel, seen as a state for victims, now called ‘survivors.’  Indeed, 
post-Holocaust language reserved the identity ‘survivors’ only for yesterday’s 
victims.  
The transition from apartheid as Political Justice
Key to the post-apartheid transition was not an exchange of amnesty for 
truth, but amnesty for the willingness to reform. That reform was the disman-
tling of juridical and political apartheid, the outcome of the round of negoti-
ations known as the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).
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The ground for CODESA was prepared by an acknowledgement by both 
sides to the conflict that their preferred solution to the conflict (victory in 
war for the government, revolution for the anti-apartheid movement) would 
not be possible. If South Africa is a model for solving intractable conflicts, it 
is an argument for moving from the best to the second best alternative.  That 
second best alternative was political reform.  
The above was tantamount to each side giving up the quest for victors’ 
justice. The reasons for this shift highlight the conditions that made the out-
come in South Africa different from those that led to Nuremberg.  They also 
underline the similarities between the conflict in apartheid South Africa and 
conflicts in contemporary Africa. First, whereas Nuremberg followed a mil-
itary victory, the conflict in South Africa had not ended. Second, whereas 
Nuremberg was informed by an overall logic that drove the post-war settle-
ment, that of ethnic cleansing, calling for a physical separation of yesterday’s 
victims and yesterday’s perpetrators into separate political communities, there 
was no question of creating an Israel for victims of apartheid in South Af-
rica.  Instead, it was clear that victims and perpetrators, blacks and whites, 
would have to live in the same country. 
Rather than put justice in the back seat, CODESA presents us with a 
radically new way of thinking about justice. To begin with, CODESA distin-
guished between different forms of justice – criminal, political and social.  It 
then prioritized political justice, the reform of the political system, over the 
other two.  
A shift of logic from the criminal to the political led to decriminalizing 
both sides to the conflict. By turning enemies into political adversaries, 
CODESA also changed the goal post.  The goal was no longer the internment 
and punishment of individuals charged with so many crimes, but a change 
of rules that would include them and their constituencies into a reformed 
political community. 
CODESA as a Critique of Nuremberg
To reflect on the lessons of apartheid, we need to begin with two ques-
tions: how shall we think of extreme violence, of mass violence – as criminal 





Makerere Institute of Social Research
  
. .  
: + - - -  | + - - -  | + - - -  (  )
: director@misr.mak.ac.ug | : http://misr.mak.ac.ug
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY
POLICY BRIEF NO.1, OCTOBER 2015
Beyond Nuremberg: Learning from 
the Post-Apartheid Transition in 
South Africa





Makerere Institute of Social Research
  
. .  
: + - - -  | + - - -  | + - - -  (  )
: director@misr.mak.ac.ug | : http://misr.mak.ac.ug
MAKERERE UNIVERSITY
POLICY BRIEF NO.1, OCTOBER 2015
Beyond Nuremberg: Learning from 
the Post-Apartheid Transition in 
South Africa6
P o l i c y  B r i e f  N o . 1, o c t o B e r  2015
or political?  And how shall we define responsibility for large-scale violence 
– as criminal or political?  
What distinguishes political from criminal violence?  The key distinction 
is qualitative. Political violence requires more than just criminal agency; it 
needs a political constituency.   More than just perpetrators, it needs sup-
porters.  That constituency, in turn, is held together and mobilized by an 
issue.  More than criminal violence, political violence is issue-driven.
The present rush for courtroom solutions advocated by the human rights 
community is the result of a double failure: analytical and political.  Analyti-
cally, it confuses political with criminal violence.  Politically, the focus on per-
petrators is at the expense of a focus on the issues that drive the violence.  It is 
likely to magnify rather than mitigate violence in the public sphere.
CODESA shed the zero-sum logic of criminal justice for the inclusive na-
ture of political justice by including both sides to the conflict in the constitu-
tional process that would forge a post-apartheid political order. Political jus-
tice affects groups whereas criminal justice targets individuals.  If the object 
of criminal justice is punishment, that of political justice is political reform.  
The Downside of the South African Transition
There are two debates in South Africa today.  The first focuses on the per-
petrator, and thus on criminal justice.  The second focuses on the beneficiary, 
and thus on social justice.  Whereas there is hardly a popular demand in con-
temporary South Africa calling for perpetrators of apartheid to be tried and 
punished, it is the debate around social justice that more and more drives the 
critique of the post-apartheid transition. This debate highlights the down-
playing of social justice in the agreements concluded at CODESA.  
The demand that the end of apartheid should have delivered social jus-
tice ignores the political reality that defined the context in which CODESA 
was negotiated.  The political prerequisite for attaining social justice would 
have been a social revolution, but there was no revolution in South Africa.  If 
apartheid was not defeated, neither was it victorious. The most one can say is 
that there was a stalemate.  
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Yet, the both the process and the outcome that marked the end of apart-
heid ruled out even a modicum of social justice. The constitution negotiat-
ed at CODESA defended the integrity of property accumulated during the 
apartheid era as part of a constitutionally sanctified Bill of Rights. The justi-
fication for this came in the form of the semi-official narrative crafted by the 
TRC: the semi-official multi-volume report of the TRC described apartheid 
not as a system in which a racialized power disenfranchised and dispossessed 
a racialized majority, but as a set of human rights violations of a minority 
of individual victims carried out by an even smaller minority of individual 
perpetrators.
Did the beneficiaries of apartheid win at the negotiating table what its 
authors and perpetrators could not win on the battlefield? If so, what set 
of political conditions made this possible? The main condition was to play 
off two wings of the anti-apartheid movement against each other, thereby 
reinforcing the leadership of the external wing and sidelining the internal 
wing.  The anti-apartheid camp comprised two very different kinds of forces: 
on the one hand, exiled ‘liberation movements,’ principally the ANC, whose 
scanty presence on the ground contrasted with its enormous popular prestige; 
and, on the other, an internally organized anti-apartheid resistance which 
knit together dozens of community and shop floor level organisations into a 
single umbrella-type network, called the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
which was responsible for the stalemate in which apartheid found itself. 
The multi-party negotiations known as CODESA went alongside informal 
bi-party talks held outside the formal negotiation setup. The ‘sufficient con-
sensus’ crafted by the ANC and the NP in the course of these informal talks 
stretched and strained the relation between the exile and the internal wings of 
the anti-apartheid opposition.  In marginalizing the forces identified with the 
internal opposition, the ‘sufficient consensus’ also sidelined their agenda for 
social justice. This constitutional closure was the result of the political alliance 
between reform forces within the ruling NP and the ANC-based exile wing, 
the alliance that ushered in the post-apartheid transition.  
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TRC
This constitutional closure was legitimized in a narrative crafted by the 
TRC. The TRC set aside the distinctive everyday violence of apartheid, the 
violence that targeted entire groups and that was central to realizing its po-
litical agenda, and thus would have made sense of the lived experience of the 
vast majority of South Africans.  This is because the TRC understood violence 
as criminal, not as political; as targeting identifiable, individual victims, and 
not entire groups; as driven by individual perpetrators, but neither the state 
that empowered them not groups of beneficiaries within society.  It focused 
on violence as excess, not as norm.  It thus limited the criminal responsibility 
of individual operatives to actions that exceeded political orders – actions 
that would have been defined as crimes under apartheid law.  In doing so, 
the TRC distinguished between the violence of apartheid – pass laws, forced 
removals, and so on – and the excess violence of its operatives.  Because it 
did so, it was unable to achieve even that which Nuremberg did: to compile 
a comprehensive record of the atrocities committed by the apartheid regime.  
The TRC shared with Nuremberg a focus on political violence as crime. 
The TRC hoped to function as a surrogate Nuremberg by displacing the logic 
of crime and punishment with that of crime and confession. The TRC ended 
up trying to hold individual state officials criminally responsible – but only 
for those actions that would have been defined as crimes under apartheid law.   
By so limiting criminal responsibility, it both upheld apartheid as a rule of law 
and the law that undergirded apartheid. This is why the TRC should be seen 
as a special court within the framework of apartheid law.
Lessons for Africa
Like the violence that marked apartheid South Africa, mass violence in 
most African countries is not the outcome of inter-state conflict; it is the 
product of civil wars. Does the end of apartheid offer a lesson for the rest of 
Africa?
The South African transition was not unique.  It was preceded by the polit-
ical settlement in Uganda at the end of the civil war (1980-86), and followed 
by the settlement in Mozambique.  The outcome of the civil war in Uganda 
made for a political stalemate in a situation in which one side (the National 
Resistance Army) had ‘won’ militarily in a war waged in the Luwero Trian-
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gle (a small part of the country), but lacked an organized political presence 
in large sections of the country. Its political resolution was a power-sharing 
arrangement called the “broad base”, which gave positions in the cabinet to 
those opposition groups that agreed to renounce the use of arms even if not 
their political objectives.
In Mozambique, six months after the South African elections in 1994, 
there was another impressive settlement, which followed a 15-year civil war. 
Like CODESA, this settlement too renounced both the battlefield and the 
courts as two versions of a winner-take-all approach, unsuited to a conflict 
in which there was no winner.  The peace process in Mozambique decrimi-
nalized Renamo, an insurgency aided and advised by the apartheid regime, 
whose practices included the recruitment of child soldiers and the mutilation 
of civilians. A retribution process in Mozambique would have meant no set-
tlement at all; instead, Renamo’s leadership were brought into the political 
process and invited to run in national and local elections. 
It is not accidental that all the examples cited above – the “broad base” in 
Uganda, the end of apartheid, and the end of the civil war in Mozambique – 
happened before the ICC was set up. In all three cases, the accent was on the 
“survivor,” not the “victim.” 
Nuremberg, Extreme Violence and the Contemporary Human 
Rights Movement
The logic of Nuremberg flowed from the context of inter-state war, one 
that ended in victory for one side, which then put the losers on trial.  The 
logic of a court trial is zero sum: you are either innocent or guilty.  This kind 
of logic ill fits the context of a civil war.  Victims and perpetrators in civil wars 
often trade places in ongoing cycles of violence. No one is wholly innocent 
and none wholly guilty. Each side has a narrative of victimhood. Victims’ 
justice is the flip side of victors’ justice: both demonize the other side, and 
exclude it from participation in the new political order.  
A civil war can end up either as a renegotiated union or as a separation 
between states.  The logic of Nuremberg drives parties in the civil war to the 
latter conclusion: military victory and the separation of yesterday’s perpetra-
tors and victims into two separate political communities.  
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The contemporary human rights movement is permeated with the logic of 
Nuremberg.  Human rights groups focus on atrocities for which they seek in-
dividual criminal responsibility. Their method of work has a formalized name: 
Naming and Shaming. The methodology involves a succession of clearly de-
fined steps: catalogue atrocities, identify victims and perpetrators, name and 
shame the perpetrators, and demand that they be held criminally account-
able. The underside of the focus on perpetrators is to downplay issues.  This 
much is clear from a reading of field reports of Human Rights Watch or 
International Crisis Group: except for a pro-forma 1-2 page introduction on 
history and context, the focus is on ‘naming and shaming’.  Indeed, context 
is considered a distraction from establishing the universality of human rights.
This is problematic if one recognizes that political violence is often not 
a standalone incident but part of a cycle of violence – a fact obscured by the 
absence of a historical context.  In a civil war, victims and perpetrators tend 
to trade places.  Each side has a narrative of victimhood. 
The tendency to portray the perpetrator as the driving force behind the vi-
olence leads to freezing the two identities, perpetrator and victim, leading to 
the assumption that the perpetrator is always the perpetrator and the victim 
is always the victim.  The result is to demonize the agency of the perpetrator 
– and diminish the agency of the victim.  Demonizing goes along with brand-
ing, and reinforces the assumption that you can easily and eternally separate 
the bad from the good.  
The more depoliticized our notion of violence, the more the temptation 
to think of violence as its own explanation.  Indeed, the tendency is to seek 
the explanation for violence in the person of the perpetrator.  From being a 
problem, violence also becomes the solution. But instead of showing a way 
out of the dilemma, violence introduces us to a quagmire.  It feeds the cycle 
of violence.
Violence is not its own explanation. This much becomes clear with a shift 
of focus from human rights to human wrongs.  Human rights may be univer-
sal, human wrongs are specific.  To focus on human wrongs is, first, to high-
light context.  It is, second, to underline issues.  And it is, third, to produce 
a narrative that highlights the cycle of violence. To break out of the cycle of 
violence we need to displace the victim narrative with that of the survivor.  A 
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survivor narrative is less perpetrator-driven, more issue-driven.   Atrocities 
become part of a historical narrative, no longer seen as so many stand-alone 
acts but as parts of an ongoing cycle of violence.  To acknowledge that victim 
and perpetrator have traded places is to accept that neither can be marked 
as a permanent identity.  The consequence is to de-demonize – and thus to 
humanize – the perpetrator.
What is an African solution to an African problem?
Both advocates and critics of “an African solution to an African problem” 
share a common assumption: that an “African solution” must be culturally 
specific and thus opposed to not only a “one-size-fits-all” universal solution 
but also to universal values, whether humanitarian or otherwise. 
The demand for an African solution arises from the experience of having 
taken, indeed having been prescribed, a series of universal remedies over time. 
The ‘One Size Fits All’ dogma began in the sphere of economic policy and 
was enforced as a series of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) by the 
Washington Consensus in the 1980s. Its destructive effects are now both well 
documented and widely acknowledged. Criminal Justice is the latest home 
of this dogma, claiming a single ‘international standard’ – as it were, a gold 
standard – for all situations of extreme violence in the name of following ‘best 
practices.’ This ‘one size fits all’ solution calls for criminal trials.
“An African solution” has to be a contextual solution. Context is not the 
opposite of a universal value or standard. Neither is it a reference to a par-
ticular – different – culture. Context is an understanding that any concrete 
situation is an outcome of multiple processes: historical, political, economic, 
social, moral and so on. The call for a contextual understanding is an argu-
ment that we need to understand the precise articulation of multiple process-
es in the creation of a single event or outcome. Thus the need to differentiate 
between different forms of violence, in particular criminal and political vi-
olence. And thus the need to think of justice in a contextual sense: both as 
political justice and as Survivors justice.
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Survivors Justice
Whereas Nuremberg has become the basis of a notion of victims’ justice – as 
a complement to victors’ justice – CODESA provides the basis for an alterna-
tive notion of justice, which I call survivors’ justice. The difference between the 
two is at least four-fold.
The first is a difference of perspective. That difference is in turn shaped 
with an eye on the future we wish to build: a renegotiated union and not 
a separation. This future is crafted through the perspective of a bystander, 
rather than that of a partisan. It is born of a recognition that political wisdom 
is the fruit of reflection, in retrospect; in the words of Hegel, ‘the owl of 
Minerva takes flight at dusk.’
The second is a difference in the meaning of ‘survivor.’ The survivor is not 
the victim who survived extreme violence, but all who survived the civil war, 
whether victim, perpetrator or bystander. All are ‘survivors.’
The third is a difference in the inclusive nature of the negotiated outcome 
to the civil war. All survivors of extreme violence must rightfully participate 
in making the new political order.  
The fourth difference lies in the means by which to create this community 
of survivors: not punishment, but political reform. Political reform targets 
entire groups, not isolated individuals. Its object is not punishment, but a 
change of rules; not state creation, but state reform. By turning its back on 
revenge, it offers the possibility of creating new communities of survivors.  By 
focusing on the link between creating an inclusive political order and an in-
clusive rule of law, it calls for a deep reflection on the relation between politics 
and law.  The point of it all is not to avenge the dead, but to give the living 
a second chance.
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